Heidegger on the Unity of Metaphysics and the Method of Being and Time by Nir, Gilad
 HEIDEGGER ON THE UNITY OF METAPHYSICS  
AND THE METHOD OF BEING AND TIME 
Gilad Nir 
Forthcoming in The Review of Metaphysics  
Abstract  
The fundamental error of the metaphysical tradition, according to Heidegger, is the 
subordination of general ontology to the ontology of a special, exemplary entity (God, the 
soul, etc.).  But Being and Time itself treats one kind of entity as exemplary, 
namely Dasein.  Does this mean that Heidegger fails to free himself from the kind of 
metaphysics that he sought to criticize?  To show how he avoids this charge I propose to 
examine the parallels between the methodology of Being and Time and the methodology 
Heidegger ascribes to Aristotle’s Metaphysics.  Heidegger takes the virtue of Aristotle’s 
inquiry to reside in the way he resists the subordination of general to special ontology: 
Aristotle was guided by a “double concept” of metaphysics, pursued two irreducibly 
distinct methods of inquiry, and avoided the temptation to unite them.  In proposing to 
similarly pursue a “double task” in Being and Time Heidegger seeks to apply this insight 
to his own work.  Alongside the task of fundamental ontology, Heidegger spells out the 
shape of a second task, Destruktion, understood as a historical critique that traces 
ontological concepts back to their ontic roots.  But Destruktion is not a mere addendum to 
fundamental ontology; the two tasks are meant to counterbalance one another and thereby 
prevent the collapse of the ontological difference between being and beings.  Indeed, 
Heidegger proposes to apply Destruktion to the results of his own fundamental ontology. 
He hopes to thereby achieve a transformation of the philosophical attitude which 
underpins the metaphysical tradition.   
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Heidegger’s Being and Time inquires into the existential structures of a being which is deeply 
rooted in its historical situation and is capable of reflecting on its own being, namely human 
Dasein.  This inquiry, which Heidegger terms “fundamental ontology,” is meant to facilitate the 
rediscovery of the more general “question of being.”  But a worry immediately arises: how can 
the ontological study of one specific sort of being (and of its specific way of being) result in a 
general ontology, an account of being as such?  This worry has not gone unnoticed by Heidegger; 
even before he completed Being and Time, his discussions of Aristotelian metaphysics led him to 
recognize it as a fundamental question: 
The fundamental question is how the problem of being gets necessarily driven 
toward a genuine entity [eigentlich Seiendes]; and whether there is any ontology 
which somehow constructs itself purely without orienting itself to a distinguished 
entity [ausgezeichneten Seienden]…   1
Aristotelian metaphysics gives pride of place to a genuine entity, divine substance, but it is not 
quite clear why this is so, and whether it always has to be so, in ontology.  These questions seem 
to apply with equal force to Being and Time itself, where Heidegger seems to pursue the 
ontology of a specific entity as a means for exposing the general sense of being.  The entity 
which is genuine (eigentlich), distinguished (ausgezeichnet) and exemplary (exemplarisch) for 
Heidegger’s inquiry is Dasein.   Admittedly, Heidegger’s privileged entity is quite different from 2
 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie (hereafter, GA22), ed. Franz-1
Karl Blust, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 22: Marburg lecture of summer semester 1926 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993), 329; compare Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (hereafter, 
SZ) (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2001 [1927]), 46. 
All translations from Heidegger’s work are my own. The Gesamtausgabe is hereafter cited as 
GA followed by the volume number and by the year of its publication in parentheses; all 
volumes of the GA are published by Vittorio Klostermann in Frankfurt am Main. 
 The term “eigentlich” is used to characterize the role of Dasein in the ontological inquiry in SZ 2
26; “ausgezeichnet” is used in SZ 14; “exemplarisch” is used in in SZ 8.  These are also the terms 
Heidegger uses to describe Aristotle’s treatment of divine substance, for example in the passage 
cited above.
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Aristotle’s: Dasein’s preeminence is not due to its being the self-thinking, self-moving, first 
cause of all other beings.  Rather, Dasein is distinguished as the being which has the capacity to 
inquire into being.   But is this enough to allay the worry about the distorting, reductive potential 3
of privileging specific entities?  In other words, doesn’t Heidegger fall prey to the very same 
problem against which he warns in his critique of the metaphysical tradition?   
Indeed, several prominent readers of Being and Time have complained that in this work, 
Heidegger confuses the question of being with the question of Dasein’s being.   My response, on 4
Heidegger’s behalf, is that Being and Time already contains an answer to this charge, and this 
answer is developed through Heidegger’s confrontation with Aristotle.  It is not only the 
emergence of traditional metaphysics that Heidegger finds in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but also 
the last signs of resistance to the collapse of the ontological difference between being and beings. 
The traditional reading of the Metaphysics against which Heidegger rebels takes Aristotle to 
subordinate metaphysica generalis—the study of being qua being—to metaphysica specialis—
the study of the foremost being, divine substance.  Heidegger, by contrast, argues that Aristotle 
saw that both directions of metaphysical inquiry are equally crucial, and therefore attempted to 
avoid their mutual subordination.  Heidegger calls this attempt the “double 
characteristic” (Doppelcharakter), the “double concept” (Doppelbegriff), the “double 
questioning” (doppeltes Fragen), or simply the “doubling” (Doppelung) of Aristotle’s 
 SZ, 12.3
 Objections along these lines can be found in Jean-Luc Marion, “Question of Being or 4
Ontological Difference,” in Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and 
Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 108–44; and Paul Ricœur, 
“Existence and Hermeneutics,” in The Conflict of Interpretations, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin, 
ed. Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 3–25.  More recently, the 
suggestion has been made that in Being and Time Heidegger propounds an “onto-theological 
structure of the metaphysics of Dasein”; only later did Heidegger supposedly realize that this 
was a mistaken path. See François Jaran, “Toward a Metaphysical Freedom: Heidegger’s Project 
of a Metaphysics of Dasein,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18, no. 2 (2010): 
205–27.  
The charge that Being and Time restricts itself to an overly narrow anthropological perspective 
goes back to Husserl.  On this see Steven G. Crowell, “Does the Husserl/Heidegger Feud Rest 
on a Mistake?  An Essay on Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology,” Husserl Studies 
18 (2002): 123–40.
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metaphysics.    5
My main aim in this paper is to show that Heidegger applies this insight by proposing to 
pursue a “double task” (Doppelaufgabe) in Being and Time; to properly pose the question of 
being, he holds, there is need for both fundamental ontology—the inquiry into the constitutive 
features of the being that is capable of asking the question of being—and Destruktion—a 
historically oriented critique of Dasein’s failures to respond to this question.   It is through this 6
doubling of the method of inquiry that Heidegger seeks to overcome the reductive tendencies of 
metaphysics.  
The double methodology of Being and Time has very seldom been acknowledged by 
Heidegger’s readers.   This is perhaps due to the fact that Heidegger never published the second 7
part of Being and Time, which was supposed to be entirely devoted to Destruktion; all we have 
 “Doppelcharakter” appears in Martin Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im 5
Ausgang von Leibniz (hereafter, GA26), ed. Klaus Held, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 26: Marburg 
lecture of summer semester 1928 (1978), 13 and 17; “Doppelbegriff” appears in GA22, 149, 179 
and 286, as well as in GA26, 202 and 229; “dieses doppelte Fragen” appears in Martin 
Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt–Endlichkeit–Einsamkeit (hereafter, 
GA29/30), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 29/30: Freiburg lecture 
of winter semester 1929/30 (1983), 52; “Doppelung” appears in Martin Heidegger, Platon: 
Sophistes (hereafter, GA19), ed. Ingeborg Schüßler, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 19: Marburg lecture of 
winter semester 1924/25 (1992), 221.
 The second chapter of the Introduction to Being and Time is titled “The Double Task in the 6
Development of the Question of Being” (SZ, 15); in describing the structure of the book, 
Heidegger says that the inquiry “forks” (gabelt sich) into these two tasks (SZ, 39). 
 A few notable exceptions to the neglect of Heidegger’s double methodology include Charles 7
Guignon, “The Twofold Task,” Tulane Studies in Philosophy 32 (1984): 53–59; Robert 
Bernasconi, “Repetition and Tradition: Heidegger's Destructuring of the Distinction Between 
Essence and Existence in Basic Problems of Phenomenology,” in Theodore Kisiel and John van 
Buren (eds.), Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994), 123–36; and Otto Pöggeler, “Destruction and Moment” in 
Kisiel and van Buren, Reading Heidegger from the Start, 137–56.
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are two-thirds of the first part of the project, which are devoted to fundamental ontology.   As a 8
result, Heidegger’s interpreters have tended to treat fundamental ontology in isolation from 
Destruktion, as if the latter were a mere addendum to the former, and as if the twofold task were 
a mere composite of two completely independent methods, rather than a unified organic whole, 
which transforms the properties that each of its components would have, were they to be pursued 
independently.   My aim, by contrast, is not merely to draw attention to the role assigned to 9
Destruktion in Being and Time, but also to argue that taking Destruktion into account transforms 
our understanding of fundamental ontology.  On the reading I propose, the entire project of Being 
and Time essentially depends on the role that Destruktion plays in the context of the double 
methodology, such that even the published part of Heidegger’s book cannot be properly 
understood in isolation from it.  It is this double methodology that allows Heidegger to give 
Dasein an exemplary role in his inquiry without thereby collapsing the crucial ontological 
difference between being and beings.   
The structure of my argument is as follows. In Section I I look at Heidegger’s reading of 
Aristotle.  I consider both what Heidegger takes to be the shape of the subordination of the 
concept of being to the concept of an exemplary being in the traditional reception of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, as well as the evidence he presents for the claim that Aristotle himself resisted this 
subordination by opting for a “double concept” of metaphysics.  In Section II I turn to 
Heidegger’s presentation of his own double methodology.  I show that Heidegger conceives of 
Destruktion as an integral part of the phenomenological method.  Indeed, he argues that the 
results of his own fundamental ontology stand in need of this form of critique.  This is so since 
 See the table of contents for the projected two volumes of the work in SZ, 39–40.  Although the 8
second part of the work was never published, it was not the only place in which Heidegger 
executed the task of Destruktion.  We find traces of it not only in the seminars and publications 
surrounding Being and Time, but also within the published parts of Being and Time itself.  The 
texts on which I rely in this paper (except for a handful of exceptions) all belong to the period 
beginning in the 1919 and concluding in 1931. 
 Over twenty years ago Robert Bernasconi admonished Heidegger scholars who ignore the 9
crucial importance of Destruktion to the project pursued in Being and Time, but the situation has 
not improved much since, and even today it is not uncommon to see fundamental ontology 
treated in complete independence from the methodological context in which it is paired with 
Destruktion.  See Bernasconi, “Repetition and Tradition,” 123—28.
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all positive inquiry concerning being is in danger of being distorted by the very language in 
which its results are framed.   
The nature of this danger is elaborated in Section III.  According to Heidegger’s 
Destruktion of ancient metaphysics, the collapse of the ontological difference has been facilitated 
by the fact that metaphysical inquiry gives precedence to the particular mode of discourse of 
theoretical assertions, logos (λόγος).  Theoretical logos presupposes a specific temporal 
understanding of being, namely as constant presence; as a result, metaphysics is barred from 
properly attending to kinds of being that are different from the present-at-hand (Vorhandensein), 
and moreover, it is prevented from properly addressing being as such.   
Heidegger’s claim that theoretical logos is unfit for ontology might seem problematic, for 
if this claim is true, shouldn’t Heidegger’s own theoretical project be hopelessly undermined?  In 
Section IV I respond to this objection by arguing that Heidegger’s project need not be construed 
in a way that makes it depend on the kind of theoretical logos which he repudiates.  The true 
nature of Heidegger’s project emerges in his discussions of the priority of ontological 
questioning over theoretical answers, as well as in his discussions of the mode of philosophical 
communication he calls “formal indication” (formale Anzeige).  But most importantly, it emerges 
from considering how the double methodology of Being and Time serves as a countermeasure to 
the metaphysical prioritization of logos.  Heidegger’s aim is neither to fulfill the metaphysical 
fantasy of providing a theoretical account of being, nor to refute it, but to completely dissolve 
this fantasy, and thereby to transform our relation to being.  His ultimate goal, in other words, is 
not theoretical but practical.  
One might wonder what role the specifically historical character of Destruktion might 
have in the context of transforming our manner of ontological questioning.  In Section V I 
propose an answer to this question, which aims to avoid two extremes: Destruktion is neither 
meant to reveal some ahistorical content (since that would render the attention to history 
superfluous), nor is it to be construed in a way that implies some form of historical relativism. 
Rather than setting us apart from our historical tradition, the role of Destruktion is to allow us to 
recognize ourselves in this history, to bring ourselves and our relation to being into question, and 
ultimately to transform us.   
6
The privileging of a specific kind of entity in Heidegger’s own inquiry, I argue in the 
concluding Section VI, ultimately avoids the pitfalls of metaphysics.  For rather than serving as 
an exemplary being from which the concept of being may be gleaned, the privileging of the 
historical being whose own attempts to inquire into being have invariably failed places in 
question the very manner in which metaphysics addresses being.  The metaphysical project of 
gleaning a general concept of being from a privileged realm of entities is not vindicated by 
Heidegger, but rather overcome.   
I 
My first goal is to establish the claim that Heidegger models the double methodology of Being 
and Time on the basis of insights he gains through his confrontation with Aristotle’s Metaphysics. 
This Section focuses on Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle; in the next Section I turn to 
Heidegger’s discussion of his own methodology.  
Heidegger’s highly original interpretation of Aristotle seeks to respond to an interpretive 
dilemma that was spelled out by one of Heidegger’s mentors, Paul Natorp.  According to Natorp, 
the text of the Metaphysics contains an “unbearable contradiction” (unleidlicher Widerspruch) 
between two directions of inquiry, which compete for the title of first philosophy.   On the one 10
hand, there is the study of the highest beings, namely theology, or metaphysica specialis.   On 11
the other hand, there is the study of being qua being, namely general ontology, or metaphysica 
generalis.   Natorp holds that Aristotle is forced to choose between the two; and contrary to the 12
traditional interpretation, Natorp argues that Aristotle’s aim is to prioritize general ontology over 
 Paul Natorp, “Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik,” Philosophische 10
Monatshefte, 24 (1888): 37–65 and 540–74, especially 49; and see Heidegger, GA26, 17.
 Pursued in Books 6 and 12 of Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. W.D. Ross, in The Complete 11
Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 1552–1728.  Citations of Aristotle’s work are made by 
reference to the Becker page and line number.
 Culminating in the inquiries of Metaphysics Books 7–9.12
7
theology.    13
Heidegger’s response to the dilemma does not consist in choosing one of its sides. 
According to Heidegger, Aristotle’s text reflects an attempt to withstand Natorp’s unbearable 
contradiction, rather than an attempt to resolve it.   Only by resisting the urge to efface the 14
traces of methodological indecision that remain visible on the surface of the text can the true 
greatness of Aristotle’s Metaphysics be revealed, for this indecision conveys the necessity of a 
deep, underlying disunity: 
This double characteristic [doppelte Charakteristik] of the πρώτη φιλοσοφία does 
not contain two fundamentally different and independent ways of thinking, nor 
may one of them be weakened or eliminated in favor of the other, nor is it even 
possible to hastily reconcile the apparent disunity [Zwiespältigkeit] into a unity.  It 
is rather the task to explain the grounds for the apparent disunity and the way in 
which the two determinations belong together in light of the guiding problem of a 
“first philosophy” of beings.    15
Heidegger here takes the disunity of Aristotle’s Metaphysics to give voice to the radical kind of 
questioning that guides his own work.  However, in Heidegger’s view Aristotle did not do 
 In fact, Natorp proposes to excise parts of the text that seem to favor the alternative reading, on 13
which the general study of being is subordinate to the special inquiry of theology (Natorp, 
“Thema und Disposition,” 58).  For criticisms of Natorp’s proposal, see William D. Ross, 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics: A revised text with introduction and commentary, vol. 1 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), 355; Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of 
his Development, 2nd ed., trans. Richard Robinson (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), 
194 and 339; and Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. 3rd ed. 
(Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), 1–68.
 Jean-François Courtine takes this to be the most original aspect of Heidegger’s reading of 14
Aristotle. See his Inventio analogiae: métaphysique et ontothéologie (Paris: Vrin, 2005), 60. 
 Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (hereafter, GA3), ed. Friedrich-15
Wilhelm von Herrmann, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 3 (1991 [1928]), 7–8; and see also GA3, 221; 
GA22, 330; GA29/30, 52; and Martin Heidegger, Aristoteles, Metaphysik Θ 1–3: Von Wesen und 
Wirklichkeit der Kraft (hereafter, GA33) ed. Heinrich Hueni, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 33: Freiburg 
Lecture of summer semester 1931 (1981), 45–47.
8
enough to prevent the eventual systematization of metaphysics via the subordination of general 
to special metaphysics.  Heidegger takes the transmitted text of the Metaphysics to reflect a 
change in view—either by Aristotle or by the editors of his texts, who failed to hold on to this 
original insight.   Thus, for Heidegger, Aristotle is a Janus-faced figure.  He sometimes says that 16
Aristotle himself failed to understand the radicality of the question he unearthed,  but in other 17
places he blames the tradition for having failed to maintain the radical attitude of questioning 
that guided Aristotle and Plato: 
Post-Aristotelian western metaphysics does not owe its form to the reception and 
development of a supposedly preexisting Aristotelian system, but rather to the 
misunderstanding of the questionability and openness in which Plato and Aristotle 
let the central problems appear.   18
Heidegger’s aim is therefore to read the Metaphysics against the traditional grain, so as to 
uncover the original “questionability,” that is, the kind of questioning that forms Aristotle’s most 
authentic concern.    19
To see how Heidegger does this we must take a closer look at his critique of the 
traditional reading of Aristotle.  It is quite uncontroversial that the central task of the Metaphysics 
is to identify the nature of first philosophy and establish its possibility, which boils down to 
determining whether there can be a single unified study of being qua being.  For Aristotle holds, 
contra Plato, that the concept of being does not have the unity of a genus, and hence that “being” 
is not univocally predicated of everything that falls under it.  Indeed, “‘being’ is said in many 
 GA22, 299; GA33, 13.16
 GA22, 180; GA26, 17; GA33, 31.17
 GA3, 8.18
 On the importance of questioning and its priority over answering in Heidegger’s conception of 19
philosophy, see Section IV, below.  
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ways,” and its senses are irreducibly manifold.   How, then, can there be a single, unified study 20
of the first principles of all being that does not undermine this ontological pluralism?  According 
to standard readings of Aristotle, the answer is that the various senses of “being” are not merely 
homonymous; they do enjoy some unity, which Aristotle calls a unity “in relation to one” (πρὸς 
ἕν).  This is the unity that various uses of a single term have when each of them relates, in its 
own particular way, to a single “focal” meaning.   One example is the unity of term “healthy.” 21
The term is used differently when it is said of the heart rate, of the activity of walking, of a piece 
of fruit, and of the living body.  It is the latter use of the term “healthy,” in which a state of a 
living substance is at issue, from which all its other uses get their meaning.  Such a weak form of 
unity, Aristotle holds, is still strong enough to guarantee the possibility of a unified science of 
being, but it is loose enough to ensure that the various meanings of “being” remain independent 
and mutually irreducible.   In the central books of the Metaphysics Aristotle seems to argue that 22
the primary sense of the term “being” is the one in which we say what a thing is, namely its 
substance.  The other senses of “being” are those which show up in categorical assertions about 
how the thing is (its quality), how much it is (its quantity), and so forth.  Each of these 
determinations of being receives its meaning from the way in which it relates to substancehood.   
Aristotle’s construal of the unity of the science of being depends on a further unifying 
move, according to the traditional reading.  Having discovered the focal unity of the scheme of 
substance and categories (first unifying move), the further move consists in subordinating the 
study of substance in general to the study of an exemplary kind of substance, namely the 
 Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.3.998b22–28, 4.2.1003a33 and 5.28.1024b10–17.  Heidegger 20
discusses Aristotle’s argument against the univocal unity of being in SZ, 3 and GA33, 43; and 
see the useful discussion in Dennis McManus, “Ontological Pluralism and the Being and Time 
Project,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 51, no. 4 (2013): 651–73.  
 The translation of πρὸς ἕν as “focal unity” is due to G.E.L. Owen, “Logic and Metaphysics in 21
Some Earlier Works of Aristotle,” in Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected papers in ancient 
Greek philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 180–200.
 Aristotle, Metaphysics  4.2.1003b6.22
10
divine.   Aristotle suggests that all substances can be rendered intelligible in terms of their 23
various relations to the primary kind of substance.  The being of divine substance thus becomes 
the “one” in relation to which being as such is understood.  Ontology is subordinated to theology.   
According to Heidegger, however, Aristotle’s aims are fatally misunderstood by this 
traditional interpretation.  Aristotle could not be taken to advocate this second unifying move, 
since he did not even fully endorse the initial unifying move, in which the various meanings of 
“being” are determined in terms of their relation to the being of substance.  Heidegger thus aims 
to undercut the idea that metaphysica specialis takes precedence over metaphysica generalis by 
showing that Aristotle himself conceived of the latter in a much more disunified way: 
… the widespread opinion that Aristotle’s doctrine of being is a “doctrine of 
substance” … is a mistake, partly stemming from the insufficient interpretation of 
the πολλαχῶς [manifold].  More precisely: one has missed the point that here 
there is only a preparation of a question.   24
In support of this claim Heidegger points out that Aristotle’s various discussions of the 
homonymy of “being” involve not one but two separate lists of manifold senses. The tradition 
has focused on the first, more restricted list, which specifies the ways in which being is 
expressed in categorical assertions—substance, quality, quantity, and so forth.   But this 25
restricted list is nested within a second list, which consists of four broader distinctions between 
 Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.1.1026a30 and 11.8.1064b6–14. Gunther Patzig defends this 23
traditional reading in describing Aristotle’s inquiry as “a double paronymical science,” by which 
he means that two focal unities of meaning allow the unification of the categories in their 
relation of substance, and the unification of all substances in relation to divine substance.  See 
“Theologie und Ontologie in der „Metaphysik” des Aristoteles,” Kant-Studien 52 (1961): 185–
205.
 GA33, 45.24
 Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.1.1028a10 and 14.2.1089a725
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different senses in which the term “being” can be used.   Here Aristotle distinguishes the way 26
“being” is employed in categorial predications from the ascription of being in potency and being 
in act, from the use of “being” in saying of something that it is true or false, as well as from the 
sense in which things are said to be pre se or per accidence.  For example, an ascription of a 
quality such as the color green to a a leaf may be meant to apply either potentially or actually; 
such an assertion may be made either truly or falsely; and it may be intended as an accidental or 
as a per se predication.  Heidegger admits that focal unity might allow Aristotle to demonstrate 
the unity of the first, more restricted list of substance and categories, but insists that it does not 
provide unity to the second, broader list.   
By contrast, the traditional interpretation of Aristotle is supported by the fact that at 
certain places Aristotle dismisses the importance of the items that belong to the second list by 
arguing that they lack ontological significance or that they merely supervene on the primary use 
of “being” in categorical assertions.   Heidegger, for his part, emphasizes other moments in the 27
text in which Aristotle explicitly treats members of the second list as candidates for serving as 
the primary sense of “being.” For example, at one point Aristotle says that being in act is the 
primary sense of “being,” presumably because the activity displayed by living substances is 
exemplary of being as such.    28
But the most important evidence for Aristotle’s resistance to the subordination of general 
to special metaphysics, in Heidegger’s eyes, is his suggestion that the sense of “being true” (a 
 The second list is given in Aristotle, Metaphysics VI.2.1026a33, and with minor changes also 26
in 5.7.1017a7–b9 and 9.10.1051a34.  Aristotle presents the first list as embedded within the 
second one in 4.2.1003a33 and 9.1.1045b32.  And see Heidegger’s discussion in GA33, 17.  
 Aristotle dismisses the ontological import of the distinction between being said simpliciter and 27
per accidens in Metaphysics 6.2.1026b2f; he rejects the relevance of “being true” and “being 
false” in 6.4.1027b17, and he minimizes the import of modal qualification in 12.2.1069b14.
 Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.8.1050b2.  For an interpretation of Aristotle according to which 28
activity is the fundamental feature of being, see Aryeh Kosman, The Activity of Being: An Essay 
on Aristotle's Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).
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member of the second, broader list) is the “most proper” (κυριώτατα) sense of being.   Aristotle 29
distinguishes here between the notion of truth that only applies to assertions and a different 
notion of truth to which he ascribes ontological primacy.  This ontologically primary notion of 
truth is the manifestation of simple, incomposite beings, of essences as well as of simple notions 
such as incommensurability and diagonality.  Here there is no question of falsity, but only of 
ignorance: one either has access to certain realms of beings or not.     30
Aristotle’s distinction is of enormous significance for Heidegger, and he picks up on it in 
drawing his own distinction between the truth of assertions and ontological truth, where the latter 
is understood as a precondition for the discovery of entities and thus for making senseful, true or 
false assertions about them.   Indeed, the priority of the ontological notion of truth is part of 31
what is ultimately supposed to justify the treatment of Dasein as the distinguished entity in the 
inquiry into being.  For Dasein is the being in whom and for whom beings are revealed as 
beings; it is thus a being which is defined in terms of its capacity for ontological truth.    32
But the traditional metaphysical reading of Aristotle which dismisses the second list of 
the diverse senses of being, to which this ontologically primary notion of truth belongs, makes it 
difficult to properly appreciate the importance of this ontological notion of truth.  Moreover, as I 
will argue in Section III, the situation of metaphysics is exacerbated by the fact that metaphysics 
itself is carried out by means of a discourse of assertions, and is therefore, according to 
 Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.10.1051b1.  For a (non-Heideggerian) discussion of the primacy of 29
the veridical sense of being, see also Charles Kahn, Essays on Being (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009).
 Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.10.1052a1.  The notion of non-assertoric truth is also discussed in 30
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, revised by J. O. Urmson, in The Complete 
Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2, 1729–1867, 
6.2.1139a21 and Aristotle, On the Soul, trans. J.A. Smith, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: 
The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 1, 641–92, 3.6.430a26.  
 SZ, 33 and 225, as well as the discussion in Martin Heidegger, Logik: Die Frage nach der 31
Wahrheit (hereafter, GA21), ed. Walter Biemel, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 21: Marburg lecture of 
wintersemester 1925/26 (1976), 170–97.  The entire discussion of logos in part B of Section 7 of 
the Introduction to Being and Time (SZ, 32–34) can be read as a commentary on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics Book 9, Chapter 10, even though Aristotle’s text is not mentioned there at all.  
 SZ, 222–30.  32
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Heidegger, only capable of attaining ontic truth.  Thus the very language of metaphysics bars it 
from acknowledging ontological truth and hence also from preserving the ontological difference.  
Let me summarize my argument so far. Aristotle’s indecision concerning the proper topic 
of the science of being is taken by Heidegger to indicate the possibility of a radical alternative 
reading of the Metaphysics.  By not imposing unity on the diverse senses of being, and by not 
seeking a solution to Natorp’s dilemma, Aristotle gives voice to the force of a fundamental 
question—which is quite different, in Heidegger’s eyes, from attempting to offer an answer to it. 
In particular, Aristotle’s nonreductive doubling of the science of being reflects an awareness of 
the great need to maintain, and of the great difficulty of maintaining, the ontological difference 
between being and beings.   Had Aristotle tried to pursue metaphysics as a pure general 33
ontology, his inquiry would have effaced important differences between distinct ontological 
regions; and had he subordinated general metaphysics to special metaphysics, his inquiry would 
have failed to maintain the ontological difference between being and beings.  Instead, Heidegger 
suggests, Aristotle maintains the irreducibility of the ontological difference by means of drawing 
an irreducible methodological difference, resulting in a “double concept” of metaphysics.  And 
this points the way for Heidegger’s own double methodology. 
It is only when Aristotle’s indecision between the two directions of inquiry disappears, 
and his radical questioning concerning the unity in diversity of the senses of “being” is forgotten, 
that metaphysics, in the pejorative sense of the term, begins.  Metaphysicians, in the wake of 
Aristotle, privilege a certain realm of entities over all others, glean some concept of being from 
it, and then apply this concept across the board, thereby collapsing the ontological difference 
between being and beings.  For example, Heidegger argues that in scholastic philosophy, 
“questioning concerning beings is not oriented toward being, but rather toward that which is a 
being in a distinguished (ausgezeichnete) sense,” namely the divine.   This is what Heidegger 34
 GA21, 410n; GA26, 202; GA33, 31.33
 Martin Heidegger,  Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant (hereafter, 34
GA23), ed. Helmuth Vetter, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 23: Marburg lecture of winter semester 
1926/27 (2006), 95.  And see also Heidegger’s critique of the scholastic theory of the analogy of 
being in SZ, 3 and GA33, 42–48.
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slightly later comes to call “ontotheology.”   35
To be clear, the collapse of the ontological difference and the emergence of ontotheology 
need not involve a complete confusion between being and some specific being, such as God. 
The failure may occur even when philosophers purport to possess a distinct concept of being, for 
example when their concept of being is acquired by abstraction from some particular region of 
beings.  Thus in his analysis of the emergence of the metaphysical concept of reality, Heidegger 
argues that the tendency of modern philosophers to orient themselves towards a specific sort of 
worldly entity (res) distorted their general capacity for ontological understanding; as a result of 
their focusing on the present-at-hand, they were neither able to properly account for beings that 
do not belong to that realm, nor for being as such.   Descartes’s account of the ego is a case in 36
point; Heidegger accuses Descartes for conceiving the being of the ego in terms of the 
substancehood of spatially extended beings.   Such a collapse of the distinctions between 37
different kinds of beings (such as the present-at-hand, ready-to-hand, and Dasein) is treated by 
Heidegger as a symptom of the underlying problem of ontotheology, namely the collapse of the 
distinction between beings and being.   
I can now more clearly restate the question with which I opened the paper: since the 
privileging of specific kinds of entities (and their ways of being) is a mark of ontotheology, 
doesn’t Heidegger’s privileging of Dasein (and its way of being) render his account equally 
problematic?  In the rest of the paper I will argue that the answer to this question is negative; by 
virtue of Heidegger’s double methodology, the privileging of Dasein does not amount to the 
collapse of the ontological difference.  What, then, is Heidegger’s intention in bringing this 
parallel to our attention?  The answer I offer is that Heidegger does that in order to give us a 
 This term first appears in Heidegger’s seminar in the winter of 1930–1931, in the context of 35
criticizing Hegel and modern metaphysics.  But it clearly informs Heidegger’s earlier critique of 
the traditional readings of Aristotle Metaphysics. I cite the passage where the term makes its first 
appearance in Section III.  See Martin Heidegger, Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes 
(hereafter, GA32), ed. by Ingtraud Görman, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 32: Freiburg lecture of winter 
semester 1930/31 (1988), 142.  For a detailed account of the emergence of Heidegger’s notion of 
ontotheology, see Courtine, Inventio Analogiae.  
 See SZ, 201.36
 SZ, 22 and 93–97.37
15
sense of the precise shape of the challenge that his methodology is designed to overcome. 
  
   
II 
The lesson Heidegger learns from Aristotle informs the project of Being and Time in the 
following way.  The overarching goal of the book is to disclose being while avoiding the 
metaphysical, ontotheological collapse of the difference between being and beings.  In particular, 
Heidegger is guided by Aristotle’s methodological insight that to keep the fundamental 
ontological question open one must employ an irreducibly double mode of inquiry.  Heidegger 
therefore proposes to reanimate the question of being by pursuing a “double 
task” (Doppelaufgabe), that is, by pursuing fundamental ontology alongside Destruktion.    38
There are obvious and important differences between Aristotle’s and Heidegger’s 
methods and their motivations, to which I will return below.  These differences notwithstanding, 
let us see how Heidegger draws our attention to the parallels and similarities.  For example, he 
often speaks of fundamental ontology in terms that assign to it the traditional role of metaphysica 
specialis, the study of the exemplary entity: 
Fundamental ontology: a being is necessarily exemplary and thus becomes the 
theme, but it is for the sake of the understanding of being, in the sense of the 
concept of being.   39
Dasein is the exemplary entity in Heidegger’s inquiry since its essential feature is its openness to 
other beings qua beings and its capacity for an authentic attainment of ontological truth.  It is the 
 SZ, 15.  Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle might not be the sole origin of his idea of the double 38
methodology.  Thus already in 1919 Heidegger proposes to combine systematic philosophy (that 
is, phenomenology) with historical hermeneutics; he there speaks of “two spheres of tasks” (zwei 
Aufgabensphären). See Martin Heidegger, Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie (hereafter, 
GA56/57) ed. Bernd Heimbuechel, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 56/57: Early Freiburg lectures of 
summer semester 1919 (1987), 106–7.
 GA22, 180.  See also GA3, 229–30, where Heidegger casts the fundamental ontological 39
inquiry in the role of special metaphysics. 
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being for whom being is an issue; hence its “ontic-ontological priority” for the inquiry.    40
But Fundamental ontology brings this specific entity into view not by studying ontic and 
empirical facts about it, but by revealing the structures which inform Dasein’s understanding of 
being.   In light of this, Heidegger sometimes reverses the analogy and correlates the historical 41
inquiry of Destruktion with special metaphysics, by contrast to the generality of fundamental 
ontology:  
The universality of the concept of being does not contradict the “speciality” of the 
investigation – namely the advancement toward it by way of a special 
interpretation of a distinct entity, Dasein, where the horizon for understanding and 
possible interpretation of being should be won.  But this entity is in itself 
“historical” [geschichtlich], and so the ontological clarification of this entity must 
turn into a “historical” [historischen] interpretation.   
The elaboration of the question of being thus divides [gabelt] into two tasks, to 
which the division of the treatise into two parts corresponds: 
First Part: The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality and the explication 
of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being.  
Second Part: Elements of a phenomenological Destruktion of the history of 
ontology along the guiding thread of the problematics of temporality.   42
The fluctuations in the way Heidegger draws the analogy between his own and Aristotle’s double 
methodology need not be taken to mean that Heidegger is undecided about the status of each of 
his tasks.  As I see it, different aims are served by each of these various ways of deploying the 
 SZ, 13.40
 SZ, 226.41
 SZ, 39; my emphasis.  See also GA3, 232, where Heidegger speaks of the need for a further 42
inquiry (beyond Fundamental Ontology) which would root Fundamental Ontology in the 
historical facticity of Dasein.  Another place where fundamental ontology seems to be correlated 
with the general side of the contrast between general and special metaphysics is GA26, 202, 
which I discuss in more detail below.
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analogy, but one common goal they all serve is to bring out the contrast between the two tasks he 
pursues and hence the doubling that both he and Aristotle promote.  Against this background, 
Heidegger sometimes applies the analogy in order to draw a contrast between his fundamental 
ontology and traditional general ontology, whereas at other times he draws it in order to show 
that within the context of his own inquiry, in which Dasein plays a privileged role, the general 
task of specifying the existential structures that enable the understanding of being (fundamental 
ontology) contrasts with the special task of inquiring into the historically factical features of our 
understanding of being (Destruktion).   
Indeed, Heidegger’s attempt to circumvent ontotheology in Being and Time involves a 
sophisticated transformation of the double structure of Aristotelian metaphysics.  He abandons 
the contrast between the general and the highest which produces the Aristotelian pair of 
metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis, and replaces it with a contrast of his own, 
between the transcendental mode of inquiry (concerning the conditions of possibility of posing 
the question of being) and the historically oriented inquiry (concerning the concrete historical 
facticity of ontological questioning).  Both of Heidegger’s tasks involve the specific, 43
distinguished entity, Dasein, though each of them concern it in a different way.  For Dasein is 
both the being who inquires into being and the being who lives out the answers that it discloses. 
So the doubling of tasks reflects the constitutive, double characteristic of this distinguished 
entity: fundamental ontology correlates with existentiality (Existenz), understood as Dasein’s 
capacity to raise the question of its own being; Destruktion, for its part, is correlated with 
Dasein’s thrownness (Geworfenheit), understood as the historical situatedness of Dasein within 
traditions in which an answer to this question is already implicitly given, and informs the 
understanding of being of its members.   44
 Heidegger often describes the contrast between his approach and Aristotle’s in terms of the 43
difference between the guiding question (Leitfrage) of the Aristotelian tradition, which dictates 
the double structure of metaphysics, with the fundamental question (Grundfrage) which guides 
his own work.  See for example Martin Heidegger, Über das  Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit 
(hereafter, GA 31), ed.  Hartmut Tietjen. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 31:  Freiburg lecture of summer 
semester 1930 (1994), 113–38.
 GA26, 13.44
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In the Introduction to Being and Time the methodological importance of Destruktion is 
somewhat obscured by the fact that Heidegger separates the discussion of the two tasks through 
which the question of being is to be prepared (Sections 5 and 6 of Being and Time) from the 
discussion of the phenomenological method of investigation (Section 7 of Being and Time).  But 
these topics belong together, as I will now argue; Destruktion and fundamental ontology are 
complementary and essential parts of one method, and cannot be treated independently of one 
another.  While this is merely implicit in the Introduction, it is evident both in earlier seminars as 
well as in the 1927 seminar, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, in which Heidegger reworks 
materials he planned to include in the third division of Being and Time.   He there explicitly 45
divides the phenomenological method into the following three basic elements: reduction, 
construction and Destruktion.   As I see it, the differences between this articulation of the 46
methodology and the one which is found in Being and Time are mostly a matter of emphasis, not 
of substance.  In the 1927 seminar, Heidegger defines reduction as the turning of the gaze from 
beings to being, that is, as drawing the ontological difference.  This idea is already present in the 
discussion of the phenomenological method in Being and Time, even though the Husserlian term 
“reduction” does not appear there, or anywhere else in the book (a significant absence). 
Nonetheless, Section 7 of Being and Time makes clear that drawing the distinction between 
beings and being is the preliminary step which opens up the field of inquiry and gives ontology 
its topic in the first place.   The second element of the method which the 1927 seminar calls 47
“construction” is defined as the explication of the structures of the being of a certain being, and 
 For an earlier discussion of Destruktion as a phenomenological method, see Martin Heidegger, 45
Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische 
Forschung (hereafter GA61), eds. Walter Bröcker and Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns, 2nd ed., 
Gesamtausgabe, vol. 61: Early Freiburg lecture of winter semester 1921/22 (1994), 141.  
 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (hereafter, GA24), ed. Friedrich-46
Wilhelm von Herrmann, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 24: Marburg lecture of summer semester 1927 
(1975), 31.  I return to this issue in Section V. 
 Compare GA24, 29 and SZ, 35.  The mysterious absence of the term “reduction” parallels the 47
absence of any explicit thematization of the ontological difference in Being and Time, which the 
1927 seminar provides the correction for as well.  
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this is precisely what fundamental ontology is tasked with in Being and Time, Section 7.  48
Finally, in the 1927 seminar Destruktion is treated as an integral part of phenomenological 
method, and it is construed as an internal self-critique which one must apply to the results of the 
constructive step of the investigation.  In other words, Destruktion allows the phenomenologist 
to come to terms with the historical situatedness of her own investigation.   The need for this 49
critical third step is not entirely absent from Section 7 of Being and Time, although it is rather 
implicit: 
Every originally created phenomenological concept [Begriff] and sentence, once 
communicated in an assertion, gives rise to the possibility of corruption 
(Entartung).  It is passed on without understanding, loses its native soil, and turns 
into a floating thesis.  The possibility of becoming hardened [Verhärtung] and 
unhandy [Ungr i f f igke i t ] o f tha t which was or ig ina l ly “eas i ly 
grasped” [“Griffigen”] arises from the concrete work of phenomenology itself. 
And the difficulty of this investigation is precisely this, to make it apply to itself 
critically in a positive way.   50
Earlier in the Introduction Heidegger explicitly stated that the task of Destruktion is to counteract 
the process through which our concepts become “hardened” (Verhärtet) once they enter a 
historical situation.  He here makes clear that phenomenology is prone to the same distortions, 51
the same kind of hardening, that traditional metaphysics falls victim to.  The manner in which 
phenomenology might overcome this predicament by being applied to itself is not named here, in 
Section 7 of the Introduction, but given his consistent choice of words, it is clear that Heidegger 
has Destruktion in mind.  There is much more to unpack here, in particular with respect to the 
 Compare GA24, 30 and SZ, 37.48
 GA24, 31.  49
 SZ, 36.  This passage plays on the cognate relation between the term “Begriff” (concept, that 50
which is grasped), “ungriffig” (unhandy) and “griffig” (easy to hold).  
 SZ, 22.51
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idea of the positive role of Destruktion, to which I return in the next sections.  For the moment it 
is only crucial to see that Destruktion forms part and parcel of the phenomenological method of 
Being and Time.  
Both texts envisage a tripartite methodology consisting of reduction, construction and 
Destruktion.  And yet, as we have already seen, Heidegger sets apart two of the elements of his 
methodology and treats them as a “double task,” in parallel with Aristotle’s “double concept of 
metaphysics.”  The reason why construction (fundamental ontology) and Destruktion stand apart 
from the first element (reduction) seems to be that the drawing of the ontological difference, in 
which the reduction consists, is not so much a separate task, but a precondition of any 
ontological inquiry. Reduction is that by virtue of which each of the the other two tasks can even 
begin to address being, rather than beings. 
There is one important methodological reflection, dating from 1928, which might seem to 
be difficult to square with my reading. In it Heidegger again compares his own methodology 
with the double structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but instead of contrasting fundamental 
ontology with Destruktion, he pairs it with a method he calls “metontology”: 
Fundamental ontology and metontology in their unity make up the concept of 
Metaphysics.  But this is only another expression for the transformation 
[Verwandlung] of the one fundamental problem of philosophy which was already 
touched on above … in speaking of the double concept of philosophy as πρώτη 
φιλοσοφία and as θεολογία. And this is just the particular concretion of the 
ontological difference, that is, the concretion of the enactment of the 
understanding of being.  52
This passage summarizes an elaborate argument that culminates in the claim that Heidegger’s 
 GA26, 202.  As I noted above, Heidegger does not always liken fundamental ontology to 52
metaphysica specialis; this 1928 text is a case in point, since here it is metontology which is 
likened to Aristotelian theology, by contrast to fundamental ontology, which is likened to general 
metaphysics.
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own project must undergo a “turn” (Umschlag, Kehre) or a transformation (Verwandlung).  53
Through this turn, the inquiry into general ontological topics, handled in Being and Time by 
fundamental ontology, would be complemented by an inquiry which is analogous to Aristotle’s 
special metaphysics (theology) inasmuch as it will concern itself with the totality of beings and 
their various ontic realms.   
Several commentators have taken the introduction of metontology in this text as a 
significant departure from the methodology of Being and Time, putatively motivated by 
Heidegger’s realizing that the one-sided focus of fundamental ontology on Dasein as a quasi-
transcendental subject.  Such one-sidedness, it is claimed, resulted in the neglect of the variety of 
ways in which Dasein’s ability to develop an understanding of being is determined by Dasein’s 
relations to others, by its history, and by other ontic factors.   Indeed Heidegger asks at the 54
conclusion of Being and Time whether ontology might in fact require an ontic foundation, and in 
another seminar from 1927 he asserts that it does.   The introduction of metontology in the 1928 55
seminar thus seems to address a lack or a defect of fundamental ontology.  But on my reading, it 
is already in Being and Time that Heidegger deploys a double methodology designed to balance 
the transcendental form of inquiry with a historical form of inquiry.   So to defend my reading, I 56
need to show that the introduction of metontology in 1928 is not a radical break with the 
overarching methodology pursued in Being and Time, but rather, at most, a further articulation of 
that methodology. 
 “Kehre” and “Umschlag” appear on the previous page, GA26, 201.  The transformation which 53
is at issue here is further discussed at the end of this section and in Section IV. 
 Robert Bernasconi “‘The Double Concept of Philosophy’ and the Place of Ethics in Being and 54
Time,” Research in Phenomenology 18 (1988): 41–57; Steven G. Crowell “Metaphysics, 
Metontology, and the End of Being and Time,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 
no. 2 (2000): 307–331; François Jaran “Heidegger’s Kantian Reading of Aristotle’s Theologike 
Episteme,” The Review of Metaphysics 63, no. 3 (March 2010): 567–91. 
 Compare SZ, 436 and GA24, p.26.55
 Charles Guignon (“The Twofold Task”) conceives of the methodological role of Destruktion 56
in a similar way. Defending Heidegger against the critique leveled by Paul Ricœur (“Existence 
and Hermeneutics”), Guignon argues that Destruktion counterbalances the one-sidedness of 
fundamental ontology.  But my understanding of Destruktion differs from Guignon in important 
ways. I discuss this in Section V, below. 
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To begin with, Heidegger does not lose sight of Destruktion in the 1928 seminar, and in 
fact the passages surrounding the introduction of metontology make the importance of 
Destruktion more explicit than ever before.   The methodological turn that Heidegger envisages 57
in 1928 is said to occur within the scope of a limited sphere of inquiry that Heidegger here calls 
“the analytic” (die Analytik), to which both fundamental ontology and metontology belong.  58
But this limited sphere is not construed as the entirety of the project.  In fact, he says that the turn 
undergone within the analytic sphere of inquiry cannot be motivated internally, by the analytic 
inquiries themselves (that is, neither by fundamental ontology nor by metontology).   
It is the nature of any analytic inquiry, Heidegger claims, that it gives the deceptive 
appearance (Täuschung) of providing us with a complete grasp of the entire ontological problem 
and purports to be able able to provide a definitive answer to it.   The origin of the turn from one 59
mode of analytic inquiry to another must therefore lie entirely outside the analytic sphere, and 
indeed, it is to Destruktion that Heidegger assigns this task: Destruktion is said to keep in check 
the tendency of analytic inquiries to “absolutize” (verabsolutieren) their own manner of 
addressing problems. Its crucial role is thus to trigger the transformation of the inquiry.    60
I conclude therefore that all three methodological discussions—the Introduction to Being 
and Time, the 1927 seminar, and the 1928 seminar—assign Destruktion a single fundamental 
role.  Destruktion is the means through which the phenomenologist turns critically against her 
own method of analytic inquiry and thereby brings about its transformation.   It remains to be 61
seen what such a transformation consists in, and how Destruktion, as a specifically historical 
inquiry, may be said to achieve it.  
 The three interpretations of this passage that I cited above—Bernasconi’s, Crowell’s and 57
Jaran’s—seem to ignore the role assigned to Destruktion in this seminar and its relation to the 
methodology of Being and Time.  This might explain why they take the 1928 passage as 
evidence for a break that leads Heidegger beyond the framework of Being and Time.
 In Being and Time, the “Analytic of Dasein” is a term Heidegger uses to refer to fundamental 58
ontology. 
 GA26, 201.59
 GA26, 197. 60
 Recall SZ, 36 and GA24, 30, both quoted above.  61
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III 
Taking its cue from the analyses of fundamental ontology, which show that Dasein’s 
understanding of being may take various temporal forms, Destruktion inquires into the concrete 
historical moments in which specific aspects of temporality became the exclusive measure for 
the philosophical engagement with being.  Such “original experiences” (Ursprüngliche 
Erfahrungen) determined the direction that ontological inquiry took by making specific ways of 
approaching beings prominent.   For example, according to Heidegger’s Destruktion of the 62
ancient Greek concept of being, the Greek understanding of being emerged from the 
“fundamental experience” (Grunderfahrung) of skillful production (τέχνη, Herstellen).   In 63
production, the aim of the craftsman’s activity is the finished product, that which is to become an 
independent being that retains a constant form; in this fundamental experience the understanding 
of beings by reference to what is constantly present in them gains prominence.  This, Heidegger 
suggests, is a historical root of the ontological privileging of the present-at-hand 
(Vorhandensein).   64
The privileging of the constantly present in ontology is facilitated, according to 
Heidegger’s Destruktion, by the privileging of a specific manner of representation through 
 SZ, 22–23; GA24, 30.  62
 See Martin Heidegger, “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der 63
Hermeneutischen Situation). Ausarbeitung für die Marburger und die Göttinger Philosophische 
Fakultät (1922),” in Phänomenologische Interpretationen Ausgewählter Abhandlungen des 
Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik (hereafter, GA62) ed. Günther Neumann. Gesamtausgabe, 
vol. 62: Early Freiburg lecture of summer semester 1922 (2005), 341–399, 367.  Similar 
analyses are found in Martin Heidegger, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie 
(hereafter, GA18), ed. Mark Michalski, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 18: Marburg lecture of summer 
semester 1924 (2002), 327; as well as in GA22, 172; GA24, 152 and 164 and following.   
Heidegger further observes that the fundamental experience for medieval philosophy is the 
experience of beings as created; see GA24, 168. 
 For the claim that a specific ontic Grunderfahrung may affect the shape of our ontological 64
understanding see also SZ, 232, as well as Heidegger’s analysis of the manner in which the 
natural, practical attitudes of Dasein transform into the theoretical, scientific attitudes, in which 
entities are approached in terms of their pure presence, in SZ, 356–364.  
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language, a specific “logos,” which is best suited for the representation of beings that are 
present-at-hand. Thus in the Introduction to Being and Time Heidegger writes: 
λέγειν [namely the activity that correlates to logos]… is the guiding thread 
[Leitfaden] for eliciting the structures of the being of a being that is encountered 
in addressing and speaking.  … λέγειν itself, as well as νοεῖν – the simple 
apprehension of something given in its pure presence-at-hand… has the temporal 
structure of the pure “being present” [Gegenwärtigens].  The being, which shows 
itself for it and which is understood as the genuine [eigentliche] entity, thereby 
receives its interpretation with a view to its being present [Gegen-wart], that is, it 
is understood as presence [Anwesenheit] (οὐσία).   65
To be clear, in criticizing logos Heidegger is not advocating the rejection of logic (whatever that 
might mean).  Rather, he merely objects to the privileging of a restricted fragment of language, 
the “logic of a specific mode of address” (die Logik eines bestimmten Ansprechens), namely that 
of predicative, categorical assertions.   An immediate outcome of the privileging of logos is the 66
failure to attend to other modes of discourse, such as requesting, praying, commanding and, most 
importantly, questioning, as well as the different manners in which each of these modes of 
discourse reveals beings.   When the logos of predicative assertion is taken to exhaust the 67
entirety of our meaningful engagement with being, the metaphysician’s gaze becomes fixed on a 
 SZ, 25–6.65
 GA62, 397.  In other places (for example, SZ, 10 and 160, and GA32, 142, which I cite below) 66
Heidegger puts the terms “logic” and “logical” in scare quotes, to signal that his target is a 
particular interpretation of logic, not logic as such.  The need to overcome the privileging of this 
narrow fragment of logos is also the central topic of Heidegger, “Was ist Metaphysik?” in 
Wegmarken, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 9 1976 [1929].  For a 
critical assessment of the difficulties Heidegger’s critique of logic is faced with see Ed 
Witherspoon, “Logic and the Inexpressible in Frege and Heidegger,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, 40, no. 1 (2002): 89–113.
 SZ, 32 and 154. On the singular importance of the attitude of questioning in Heidegger’s Being 67
and Time, see Section IV, below. 
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narrow range of phenomena, namely the being of those beings which this mode of representation 
is best suited to articulate: beings that are present-at-hand, substances and their categories.    68
The prioritization of this narrow, “logical” fragment of language is crucial for 
understanding how it became possible to subordinate metaphysica generalis to metaphysica 
specialis, resulting in the ontotheological structure of metaphysics:  
With the expression “ontotheology” we say that the problem of the ὄν [being] as a 
logical problem is from first to last oriented toward the θεός, which is itself 
already conceived of “logically.”   69
Heidegger’s critique of the traditional reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, I have argued in 
Section I, is focused on the process through which this ontotheological structure emerges. 
Heidegger points out that in subordinating general metaphysics to special metaphysics, the 
tradition dismissed key ontological distinctions, particularly Aristotle’s distinction between the 
ontologically fundamental notion of truth and the less fundamental notion of the truth of 
assertions.  Ignoring this distinction, metaphysics itself came to privilege the logos of assertions, 
whose success is measured by the less fundamental notion of truth, and thereby prevented itself 
from acknowledging ontological truth.  The result is a distorted picture of what ontological 
inquiry may hope for.  Given that the logos of assertions is particularly apt for representing the 
present-at-hand, the language of metaphysics prevents itself from properly appreciating the being 
and temporal features of other kinds of entities.  One example for this is the distorted 
understanding of the being of Dasein through reification, that is, through the attempt to apply the 
 Further discussions of logos as a mode of representation that fits a narrow temporal 68
understanding of being, namely the constant presence of the present-at-hand, are found in Martin 
Heidegger, Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung (hereafter GA17), ed. Friedrich-
Wilhelm von Herrmann, 2nd. ed., Gesamtausgabe, vol. 17: Marburg lecture of winter semester 
1923/24 (2006), 20; as well as GA19, 224–25, GA22, 155 and GA29/30, 424.  In SZ, 157 
Heidegger contrasts the discourse of predicative assertions with the discourse employed in the 
context of the non-theoretical, practical engagement with tools.  
 GA32, 142.69
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categories of worldly entities (present-at-hand) to it.   Another central example is the inability of 70
traditional ontology to account for the mode of being encountered in practical engagements with 
equipment (Zuhandensein).    71
But most importantly, Heidegger holds that by privileging this restricted logos, by 
making it into the exclusive mode of the theoretical discourse of philosophy, metaphysics blocks 
the possibility of appreciating being as such: 
A mundane assertion [weltliche Aussage] about the present-at-hand, even when it 
takes the form of a mere naming, can refer to its object directly, while an assertion 
about Dasein and moreover every assertion about being… requires for its 
intelligibility a turn [Umstellung] of the understanding, a turn to the matter 
indicated, which is essentially not a present-at-hand.  Because for the Greeks, for 
Plato as well as for Aristotle… all assertions are understood as mundane 
 SZ, 46; Heidegger suggests that Dasein’s constitutive tendency to misinterpret itself 70
(Verfallenheit) is the origin of metaphysical confusions; see GA 29/30, 426.  Recall also 
Heidegger’s critique of Descartes, discussed at the end of Section I.  And see Section IV, below.  
 SZ, 71.  Recently, objections have been made to the validity of the claim that theoretical logos 71
can be taken to restrict ontology in this way; I discuss these in the next section.
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assertions, it transpired that being itself, insofar as it came into view, was 
conceived of as a being.   72
Metaphysics emerges when “being itself” is “conceived of as a being,” that is, when the 
ontological difference collapses.  As Heidegger argues in this passage, this collapse is guaranteed 
to take place when one prioritizes the logos of “mundane” assertion.  The very “logic” of logos, 
he argues, is biased with respect to the ontology of the present-at-hand.    73
Logos is only apt to capture ontic truth, and so any attempt to capture ontological truth by 
its means, that is, to construct a theoretical account of being, is guaranteed to fail.   This is 74
another reason why the double methodology is crucial to Heidegger’s project.  For Destruktion is 
meant to apply not only to historical views but also to Heidegger’s own (and to our own) 
constructive investigations, and thereby to counterbalance the corrupting influence of theoretical 
logos; it is meant to help us resist the temptation to take the results of these investigations at face 
value.   75
 GA21, 410n. In the clauses which I left out of the quote Heidegger contrasts “mundane 72
assertion” (weltliche Aussage) with “categorial assertions” (kategoriale Aussage) to distinguish 
two modes of discourse: that through which we describe worldly entities, and that through which 
we describe ways of being of such entities (the term “categorial” as it is used here is probably 
derived from Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition).  The complaint Heidegger makes is that 
the tradition fails to secure the independence of the latter, phenomenological mode of discourse 
from the former, with the result that ontological insights are distorted by the mode of expression 
in which they are framed.   
The terminology Heidegger chooses to use here is particularly confusing because in Being and 
Time, ontological determinations of Dasein are termed “existential” statements (for example, SZ, 
123) and they are contrasted with determinations of other beings, which are termed 
“categorial” (for example, SZ, 44).  To avoid confusion, I exclusively use the term “categorical” 
to mean what Heidegger here calls “mundane assertions.”  And see the discussion in Daniel O. 
Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications,” The Review of 
Metaphysics 47, no. 4 (June 1994): 775–95, 787n. 
 SZ, 165.73
 SZ, 33; compare SZ, 225. 74
 Recall Heidegger’s discussion of the need to avoid the “hardening” of ontological insights and 75
the “absolutizing” tendencies of “analytic” inquiries, examined in Section II above.
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IV 
Recent commentators have objected to the claim that metaphysics is restricted to the use of the 
logos of assertion, as well as to the claim that the logos of assertion is incapable of revealing 
beings other than the present-at-hand, let alone to reveal ontological truths, and to the claim that 
there is no other, unproblematic form of theoretical discourse concerning being.   I believe the 76
evidence presented thus far leaves little room for doubt that Heidegger himself did hold these 
convictions.  But whether Heidegger held them or not, the question remains whether they are 
ultimately justifiable.  The most pressing problem seems to be that the conviction that there can 
be no theoretical discourse concerning being seems to imply that Heidegger’s own inquiry 
cannot succeed in doing what it purports to do—as long as that inquiry is construed in terms of 
giving a theoretical answer to the question of being.  The decisive objection, in other words, is 
that by repudiating theoretical logos, Heidegger’s project (so construed) comes to seem 
inconsistent and self-undermining.    77
In the limited context of the present paper I do not attempt to offer a positive argument of 
my own for the claim that theoretical philosophy is prevented from properly addressing certain 
kinds of being (and being as such).  Rather, I will offer an indirect argument for it by showing 
that it does not render Heidegger’s project inconsistent.  The first step in my argument consists in 
showing that Heidegger does not purport to provide a theoretical account of being.  Instead, I 
construe his ultimate goal in practical, not theoretical terms: his aim is to transform us and our 
relation to being.  In order to achieve this goal what is needed is not to convince us of any claims 
by means of the logos of assertion, but to get us to recognize the underlying failure of our 
 In “Heidegger’s Method” Daniel Dahlstrom attributes such views to Heidegger and takes them 76
to form a predicament from which Heidegger sought to extricate himself by means of thee 
method of formal indication (which I further discuss below).  Joseph Schear, “Judgment and 
Ontology in Heidegger’s Phenomenology,” The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and 
Phenomenological Research 7 (2007): 127–58; and Sacha Golob, “Heidegger on Assertion, 
Method and Metaphysics,” European Journal of Philosophy 23, no. 4 (2015): 878–908 both 
maintain that it is wrong to attribute to Heidegger the claim that logos is restricted to the present 
at hand; they also argue that this claim is false.
 Denis McManus construes the difficulty along these lines in “Ontological Pluralism”.77
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philosophical employment of logos.  The doubling of methods in Being and Time, I will go on to 
argue, is designed to fulfill this goal, and to achieve it without any self-undermining use of 
theoretical logos.  78
Heidegger’s Destruktion of ancient metaphysics, I have argued, purports to expose a 
predicament of all ontological theorizing: representation by means of logos imposes a specific 
temporal structure that prevents us from appreciating the variety of modes of being, aside from 
the present-at-hand; any attempt to form such a theoretical account of being thus ends up 
reducing being to beings.  By employing the logos of theoretical inquiry we objectify 
(vergegenständlichen) being, and thereby collapse the ontological difference.  Ontological 
theory, Heidegger concludes, is always a mix of truth and untruth.   This is the sense in which 79
the recurring failure of metaphysics to properly address the question of being is not a mere 
historical coincidence.  Recall the quote with which I opened this paper, where Heidegger says: 
“The fundamental question is how the problem of being gets necessarily driven toward a genuine 
entity.”   The necessity of which Heidegger speaks is a mark of our finitude; an absolute 80
conception of being is not available to us.    81
But Heidegger is well aware that this predicament applies to his own temporal analyses 
of being as well.   As we have seen in Section II, he is wary of the “absolutizing” tendency of all 82
“analytic” inquiries.  But he seems to think that there is no other way to address this problem, let 
 I thank an anonymous referee for this journal for pressing me to clarify the shape of my 78
argument in this way. 
 GA24, 459.79
 GA22, 329, my emphasis.80
 GA3, 245 and see also Martin Heidegger, “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” in GA9, 177–202, 197. 81
Thomas Sheehan argues that this ontological sense of finitude—the intractable concealment of 
being—is a discovery that Heidegger first makes in this text from the year 1930, and that this 
leads him beyond the confines of the Being and Time project.  By contrast, I take this to be 
anticipated in Heidegger’s earlier discussions of Destruktion and ontotheology in his seminars. 




alone overcome it, except by letting the constructive part of the phenomenological inquiry run its 
course, and then allow the destructive part turn critically against the results achieved by it.  
Heidegger’s manner of responding to this predicament is prominently brought into view 
from the very beginning of Being and Time, with the citation from Plato’s Sophist and the 
ensuing discussion of the forgetfulness of the question of being.   Metaphysical forgetfulness is 83
not contrasted there with the possession of an answer, but rather with reanimating the question of 
being.  Indeed, given the shape of the predicament—that the very logos of a metaphysical answer 
effaces the ontological difference—awakening the attitude of questioning seems like the only 
achievable goal.  For any attempt to answer the question of being, to the extent that it involves 
theorizing by means of logos, is bound to distort our relation to being.  This is why in stating his 
aims for Being and Time, Heidegger takes pains to avoid the implication that what the book 
achieves is an answer, understood as a positive, self-standing thesis that we can from now on 
hold on to.  Even when he says that an answer to the question of the meaning of being is to be 
given in the “exposition of the problematics of temporality,” he immediately goes on to clarify 
that this “answer” is only a new manner of framing the problematic, and thereby indicating the 
direction of further questioning.   84
The priority of the ontological question over its putative answer goes back to Heidegger’s 
earliest discussions of the phenomenology of questioning, in the summer of 1919.   Heidegger 85
there warns against the reification of the subject of inquiry that occurs in the process of framing 
an answer to fundamental ontological questions.  To draw the ontological difference radically 
enough, and thus to avoid the objectification of being, what is required is not merely to mark out 
a difference between two distinct subject matters that theoretical discourse may address.  What is 
required is that we uphold a distinction between two forms of address, two modes of discourse. 
The logos of assertion that we employ in answering cannot address being without distorting it; 
the mode of access which is most proper to being is rather that of questioning.  That this line of 
 SZ, 1–2.83
 SZ, 19.  Admittedly, Heidegger does not always resolutely avoid implying the possibility of 84
positive theoretical results.  See for example, GA24, 459.
 GA56/57, 59–69.85
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thought continues to inform the project of Being and Time is also evident from the fact that 
Heidegger concludes the book by saying that the value of the inquiry does not lie in the 
correctness of its results, but in the extent to which it sparks the attitude of fundamental 
questioning.   86
The need to avoid theoretical logos in order to prevent the collapse of the ontological 
difference is addressed in Being and Time in terms of the need to resist Dasein’s 
“fallenness” (Verfallenheit)—its tendency to misinterpret itself in terms of the being of the 
present-at-hand that surrounds it.   This is the background against which Heidegger deploys the 87
manner of communication he calls “formal indication” (formale Anzeige).  Thus we are 
constantly reminded that the constitutive ontological features of Dasein are not given in terms of 
theoretical descriptions, but by means of this alternative discourse.   Heidegger goes as far as to 88
suggest that “all philosophical concepts are formal indications.”   The most important aspect of 89
formal indication, for our purposes, which connects it to the idea of awakening the questioning 
attitude, is that rather than being a means for communicating theoretical knowledge, formal 
indications are construed as a manner of setting up tasks for the reader.   The aim of such tasks 90
is not to provide information, but to to effect a transformation (Verwandlung).   91
 SZ, 437.  Recall my discussion in Section I of the radical form of questioning Heidegger 86
ascribes to Aristotle.  Importantly, Aristotle is there said to have preserved this attitude of 
questioning by means of his double concept of metaphysics. 
 SZ, 15, 21, 175–84, and 346–50 as well as GA29/30, 426. 87
 SZ, 114, 115, 313 and 315.  The notion of formal indication is discussed extensively in the 88
lectures of 1921/1922 (GA61, 32–35 and 140–155), as well as in the 1929/1930 Seminar 
(GA29/30, 421–31).  Heidegger there explains that all the claims he makes in Being and Time 
about Dasein, about death, and about nothingness would be misunderstood if one took them as 
descriptive statements, rather than as formal indications (GA29/30, 428–9).  See also Dahlstrom, 
“Heidegger’s Method” and Matthew I. Burch, “The Existential Sources of Phenomenology: 
Heidegger on Formal Indication,” European Journal of Philosophy 21, no. 2 (2011): 258–78.
 GA29/30, 430. 89
 GA29/30, 425.  And see GA33, 13, where Heidegger says that Aristotle’s distinction between 90
the manifold senses of being is not an answer, but a manner of setting up a task.
  As Heidegger puts it, formal indications pose a “demand for transformation.” See GA29/30, 91
428–429.
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Rather than attempting to replace an erroneous metaphysical account of being with a 
theoretical account of his own, Heidegger undertakes to transform our metaphysical relation to 
being from the ground up.  This is the goal that the double methodology of Being and Time 
serves: by subjecting all philosophically constructive theories, including fundamental ontology, 
to Destruktion we learn to treat the results of such analytic inquiries as (at best) mere formal 
indications, and resist the tendency to confuse acts of questioning for the provision of answers. 
We thereby learn to engage in the attitude of authentic questioning ourselves.   But it is not yet 92
clear why Heidegger thinks that in order to achieve this, what is needed is a specifically 
historical mode of critique.  I now turn to treat this question. 
V 
It comes as no surprise that the inquiry into the being of beings such as Dasein belongs to 
ontology, even though one might certainly wonder whether any inquiry which focuses on one 
specific region of entities should count as fundamental.  With Destruktion, however, things are 
quite different: it is not at all obvious how Destruktion fits into the ontological inquiry, and the 
claim that it forms an essential part of ontology might seem mysterious.  And yet Heidegger 
claims that only through Destruktion could the ultimate goal of Being and Time be achieved: 
It is through the execution of the Destruktion of the ontological tradition that the 
question of being gains its true concretion for the first time.  93
   
Despite Heidegger’s own indications, it is not uncommon to think that the role of Destruktion in 
Being and Time is merely negative: Destruktion, on this construal, is a critique of concepts that 
were delivered to us by tradition; its aim is to peel off the outer layers which cover over the 
 GA29/30, 495; and see GA24, 31 and GA26, 197–8. 92
 SZ, 26.93
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original insights from which these concepts sprung.   This negative construal of Destruktion 94
does not exclude, but rather presupposes that there is some positive content which underlies our 
traditional concepts.  But since this positive content is taken to be out there, independently of 
whether we discover it by means of Destruktion or by any other means, the negative construal 
ultimately fails to secure the indispensability of a specifically historical mode of inquiry.   
Charles Guignon’s interpretation is a case in point.  Although Guignon is one of the very 
few interpreters who acknowledge the crucial importance of the double methodological context 
in which Destruktion is coupled with fundamental ontology, the manner in which he attempts to 
explain why Destruktion is essential to the inquiry gives it this merely negative role.  He holds 
that by eliminating the inessential and misleading aspects of traditional concepts, Heidegger aims 
to expose “transhistorical meaning” and “primordial ways of understanding Being which course 
through history.”   But the worry immediately arises: if our concepts do contain such a positive 95
core, why can’t it be grasped on its own, without the detour of considering their historical origin? 
In other words, if Destruktion is carried out from a privileged point of view which transcends the 
limitations of the tradition which it criticizes, it does not seem to be necessary for us to engage 
with that tradition in the first place, since we can focus instead on the putatively correct, 
“transhistorical meaning” which is available to us from our privileged point of view.  The 
“transhistorical” collapses into the “ahistorical”; far from being essential to ontology, 
Destruktion, on this construal, would come to seem superfluous.   
Indeed, Heidegger rejects the idea that there are absolute, transhistorical constants to be 
discovered by us through historical inquiry.   This is not because he is assuming some form of 96
historical relativism; in fact he explicitly warns against thinking that the essential role he gives to 
 The negative construal finds support in SZ, 22.  William McNeill, for example, argues that in 94
Being and Time Heidegger employs only this negative understanding of Destruktion, and that it 
is only in Heidegger’s later work that Destruktion becomes an essential ontological task, directed 
at uncovering the “history of being.”  See McNeill, “From Destruktion to the History of Being,” 
Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 2 (2012): 24–40.  Pace McNeill, I argue that 
Destruktion plays a more robust and essential role in the early work as well. 
 Guignon, “The Twofold Task,” 57.95
 SZ, 395.96
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history in shaping Dasein’s understanding of being leaves his project open to a charge of 
relativism.   Relativism, too, would fail to give history an indispensable role in Heidegger’s 97
ontological inquiry: insofar as relativism sets the historical other at an unbridgeable distance 
from us, it renders the past irrelevant for our present ontology.  The positivity of Destruktion and 
its essential role for Heidegger’s inquiry must therefore be construed neither in terms that 
relativize ontological content to incommensurable historical standpoints nor in terms that assign 
Destruktion the role of delivering ahistorical content.  The key is to reject the idea that the turn to 
history is supposed to deliver any content whatsoever. 
With this task in mind, let us look more closely at the way in which Heidegger specifies 
the positive role of Destruktion. Destruktion is not supposed merely to lead us to mistrust the 
answers that the metaphysical tradition delivers, but also to recognize in ourselves, as essentially 
historical beings, the source of the metaphysical tendency to distort being: 
Antiquity is not to be overcome… but its bad champions must be fought.  That 
can only happen if we strive to provide an occasion for the transformation 
[Verwandlung] of these fundamental problems, that is, of the metaphysica 
naturalis that belongs to Dasein itself.  This is what I understand as the 
Destruktion of the tradition.  The point is not to eliminate these two Millenia and 
place oneself in the place they occupied.    98
To see the history of metaphysics as our own—to see this history as the result of our recurrent 
failure to address being—is to come to terms with what “belongs to Dasein itself,” that is, with 
our own human nature.  For metaphysics, as depicted by Destruktion, is not a mere mistake or 
accident that we can distance ourselves from.  The history of metaphysics is the unfolding of a 




Metaphysics is not something which is merely “created” by human beings in 
systems and doctrines.  Rather, the understanding of being, its projection and its 
shift, happens in Dasein as such.  “Metaphysics” is the fundamental happening 
[Grundgeschehen]…   99
Destruktion thus allows us to see philosophy itself as a historical happening, an ongoing event or 
series of events in which our relation to being is determined (and distorted) by our metaphysical 
tendency.  Through Destruktion, we are meant to come to recognize that we ourselves belong 100
to this event, that this is our own historical destiny—which may well be a destiny of failure to 
address being properly.  101
But Heidegger adds that by negatively indicating the “limits” of our tradition, 
Destruktion also reveals “positive possibilities”: 
Nor does Destruktion have the merely negative sense of breaking free from the 
ontological tradition.  On the contrary, it ought to mark out the positive 
possibilities of this tradition, and that means, to mark out its limits, which are 
given factically in the particular ways of questioning and in the delimitations of 
the possible field of inquiry that they dictate.   102
By showing how each moment in the long series of metaphysical failures to address the question 
of being forms part of a single whole—a whole to which we ourselves belong—Destruktion 
 GA3, 242; compare “Was ist Metaphysik?,” 122, and GA29/30, 512–32.  99
 See, in particular, GA3, 214, where Heidegger discusses Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a 100
“happening” (Geschehen) not in the sense of its effects on its era, but in the sense that in the 
Critique itself something occurs—the ontological significance of time is momentarily revealed, 
only to be concealed again. 
 For Heidegger’s conception of historical destiny, see SZ, 386.  Our metaphysical destiny is 101
described as the “hidden and inner life of the fundamental movement of western philosophy” in 




allows us to resolutely address our own tendency to commit such failure.  This engagement with 
history is what Heidegger calls the retrieval, through repetition (Wiederholung), of that which 
belongs to our own true self.   What genuinely belongs to us and to our ontological questioning 103
is not something that history somehow conceals from us, but rather is this very history.  For it is 
by means of appreciating the depth of our attachment to metaphysics—the way in which its 
dissimulations and distortions flow from our own finitude—that we may also hope to see our 
way beyond it.   104
Destruktion leads us from the abstract, theoretical mode of thinking of metaphysics, 
which isolates the content to be thought from the historical situatedness of the thinker, to a 
concrete mode of thinking which is in each case mine, and always involves me in my historical 
situation.   Heidegger hopes that by acknowledging this historicity to be constitutive of our 105
own self, we would become able to alter the way in which we take part in history: 
Since the mode of being of such questioning is itself historical, it directs the 
elaboration of the question of being to ask after its own history, that is, to become 
historical.   106
 SZ, 386; and for an application of this approach in the Destruktion of Kant’s ontology, see 103
GA3, 204. 
 Another upshot of my argument here is that Heidegger’s insistence on the indispensability of 104
Destruktion in his early work anticipates a theme that becomes much more prominent in his later 
philosophy, namely the history of being.  This claim might seem contentious, especially given 
that the later Heidegger himself lamented the “naïveté” of Destruktion in Being and Time. 
Nonetheless, the evidence I present here suggests that Heidegger’s later and earlier work are 
closer than he might have been ready to admit.  For Heidegger’s self-critique see Martin 
Heidegger, Seminare (1951–1973), ed. Curd Ochwadt. 2nd ed. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 15 (2005), 
398. For an interpretation that draws a stark contrast between the early and later uses of history 
(and Destruktion) in Heidegger’s work, see McNeill, “From Destruktion to the History of 
Being,” 31.  For a critique of the dichotomy between early and late in Heidegger, see Theodore 





The positivity of Destruktion thus has little to do with the content it supposedly identifies and 
preserves, a content which stands apart from the activity of inquiry.  Rather, what is positive in 
Destruktion is the transformative effect it can have on us, qua inquirers.   Since we do not 107
occupy a privileged point of view in the history of metaphysics, realizing the historical 
situatedness of our own inquiries—where belonging to this history means sharing the tendency 
to misconstrue our relation to being—alters the way in which we understand the results that the 
analytic part of our inquiry delivers.  Destruktion thereby helps reawaken the question of being, 
keep it an open question for us, and ultimately allow our very relation to being to transform.  And 
this construal of Destruktion, as aimed to effect a transformation in the inquirer, rather than to 
deliver theoretical content, succeeds in giving history an essential role while escaping the 
dilemma between ahistoricism and relativism.  
VI 
Before I conclude I would like to return to the problem with which I opened this paper.  The 
worry was that Heidegger’s choice of Dasein as the privileged entity in ontology reflects his own 
failure to overcome the ontotheological tendency of metaphysics.  Heidegger has putatively 
reintroduced the subordination of metaphysica generalis to metaphysica specialis, while 
replacing God with Dasein; in consequence, Heidegger’s Being and Time allegedly ended up 
with a distorted account of being.  Here is how I understand Heidegger’s defense against this line 
of objection.  Unlike scholastic metaphysics, in which the general ontological inquiry is 
subordinated to the study of a distinguished entity, in Being and Time neither of the two tasks 
take primacy over the other.  Both of Heidegger’s methods put Dasein in the center, though each 
does it in its own way, and they are both employed as means for reanimating the question of 
being, rather than as attempts to provide a direct answer to it.  So Dasein does not come into the 
 Benjamin D. Crowe similarly understands Destruktion as a means for effecting a practical 107
transformation of the thinker who engages in it.  See Heidegger’s Religious Origins: Destruction 
and Authenticity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), especially 235 and following. 
The suggestion that Destruktion enables such a form of ontological freedom is also made in 
Jaran “Towards a Metaphysical Freedom.”  
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picture as an answer to the dogmatic question: what is the exemplary being from whose being the 
being of all beings is to be gleaned?  Nor is the privileging Dasein meant to provide an answer to 
the transcendental question as to the conditions of possibility of an understanding of being. 
Rather, what is placed at the center with Dasein is its tendency to glean a concept of being from 
privileged entities, and therewith its tendency to conceal being by framing it in terms that are 
only appropriate to beings.  The focal point of Heidegger’s inquiry, as it emerges from the 
interplay between fundamental ontology and Destruktion, is not that of the subject that 
constitutes its own ontology, but rather that of the historical being who is constituted by a mode 
of relating to being which is all but guaranteed to distort it. In other words, Dasein is exemplary 
as the being who is not merely concerned with being, but also obscures and forgets it.   
All this applies with equal force to the beings who attempt to reanimate the question of 
being, namely to the author of Being and Time and to its readers.  The inquiry must therefore be 
turned against itself, and fundamental ontology must itself be subjected to Destruktion.  As 
Heidegger puts it, ontology must be led back to where it springs from, namely back to the 
historically situated attitude of questioning.   This is miles away from the philosophical attitude 108
that underlies the ontotheological subordination of general ontology to special ontology, for the 
goal for Heidegger is not to provide a theory of being by reference to any specific being, but to 
find in ourselves the roots of the tendency to provide such distorted theoretical accounts of being 
and to thereby learn to resist this tendency.  Since this is the authorial point of view of Being and 
Time, it is no wonder that the book concludes by contemplating the value that the work might 
still have even if all that fundamental ontology achieves is to chart an incorrect way to engage 
with the question of being.   109
To conclude, the aim of Being and Time is to animate an attitude of radical questioning 
that would ultimately transform our relation to being.  But the form of our relation to being is not 
something that a fundamental-ontological account of Dasein can fully determine, let alone alter, 




context of a double methodology, that Heidegger’s inquiry can hope to achieve its goal.   110
 For their many helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper I am grateful to Filippo 110
Casati, Stephen G. Crowell, Netanel Kupfer, as well as to an anonymous referee for this journal. 
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